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 The Geography of Support 
for Democracy in Europe∗ 
 
CLAUDIU D. TUFIŞ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 The stability of a political system depends to a large extent on the 
degree of popular acceptance of the principles that create the framework of the 
political system. This is particularly true in the case of democratic political 
systems, because the set of actions that can be taken to ensure the survival of the 
system is limited to only those actions that are acceptable under the rules of the 
democratic game. If this is true, then it follows that the way people react to the 
principles of the political systems governing their lives is of particular interest 
for democratic systems.  
This is the main topic I address here. This paper focuses, primarily, on 
understanding the mechanisms of support for democracy, distinguishing 
between democracy and authoritarian alternatives. While the existing literature 
tends to analyze support for democracy as a unidimensional phenomenon, my 
approach is to think of democracy and authoritarian alternatives not as two ends 
of the support for democracy dimension, but, rather, as distinct sub-dimensions. 
While in some contexts the two sub-dimensions of support for democracy may 
be strongly related, justifying a single dimension approach, in other contexts I 
expect these sub-dimensions to be independent of each other, support for each 
of the sub-dimensions being generated through distinct mechanisms, justifying, 
thus, a bi-dimensional approach. The results presented here will show that this 
bi-dimensional operationalization of support for democracy fits better the reality. 
A second central point of this paper is the assumption that the 
mechanisms of support for democracy/authoritarian alternatives are not 
homogenous across all Europe. One cannot expect the citizens of the older 
democracies in Western Europe to have the same views on democracy as a 
citizen from a former communist country. Moreover, based on advances 
towards democratic consolidation, the postcommunist transitions in Central and 
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Eastern Europe have shown two distinct groups of countries. The first group 
includes those countries that have managed the transition rather successfully 
(Western ex-communist countries/Central Europe), while the second group 
includes the laggards and those that have failed to complete the transition 
(Eastern ex-communist countries/Eastern Europe). The analyses I present here 
will show that the mechanisms of support vary significantly across these three 
groups of countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. The first section of the paper presents 
a brief overview of the literature on support for democracy and the theoretical 
framework used in this article. The next section describes the data and the 
methodology used in the paper. The main part of the paper is devoted to 
presenting and interpreting the results of the data analysis, followed by a section 
that summarizes the main findings of this study. 
 
 
Support for Democracy 
 
Although a certain history ended in 1989, with the fall of the communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, other histories began at the same 
moment. In the case of the ex-communist countries, this new history was built 
around the complex transition from communism to democracy and from 
planned economy to market economy. The simultaneity of the political, 
economic, and social transitions represented the main characteristic of the post-
communist transitions1. Such a complex project convinced some authors that 
the post-communist transitions had rather low odds of success2. In most cases, 
however, time disproved most of these predictions and showed that “amazingly 
little resistance from below has come to those reforms that have been 
instituted”3. The main negative effect of the simultaneous transitions was that 
                                                 
1
 Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997; Andreas Pickel, Helmut Wiesenthal, The Grand 
Experiment: Debating Shock Therapy, Transition Theory, and the East German 
Experience, Westview Press, Boulder, 1997; George Schopflin, “Postcommunism: The 
Problems of Democratic Construction”, Daedalus, vol. 123, no. 2, 1994, pp. 127-141. 
2
 See, for instance: Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy 
Reconsidered”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 35, no. 4-5, 1992, pp. 450-499; 
Stephen Haggard, Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Joan Nelson, “Linkages between Politics and 
Economics”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 4, 1994, pp. 49-62; Adam Przeworski, 
Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
3
 John Hall, “After the Vacuum: Post-communism in the Light of Tocqueville”, in Beverly 
Crawford (ed.), Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-
Communist Transformations, Westview Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 89. 
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the transition to democracy was complicated and prolonged by the transition to 
a market economy. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the literature discussing different 
phenomena grouped under the general headings of democratization and 
marketization flourished, as political scientists and sociologists used this newly 
available group of countries to study different aspects of the relationship 
between the democratic transition and the economic transition. They 
approached this relationship either at the macro level, focusing on the new 
institutional set-up and on its performance4, or at the individual level, focusing 
on mass support for political and economic reforms5. 
While the debates about the type of market economy to be implemented 
have started right from the beginning of the transition, in the case of the 
political transition in most countries there seemed to be a general consensus that 
a democratic political system was the only valid choice. This was quite visible 
in consistently high levels of support for democracy recorded throughout the 
region6. Later studies have used more detailed measures of support for 
democracy, showing significant variation in the level of support for democracy 
                                                 
4
 Michael Bernhard, Christopher Reenock, Timothy Nordstrom, “Economic Performance 
and Survival in New Democracies: Is there a Honeymoon Effect?”, Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, 2003, pp. 404-431; Ross Burkhart, Michael Lewis-Beck, 
“Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis”. American Political 
Science Review, vol. 88, no. 4, 1994, pp. 903-910; Marcus Kurtz, Andrew Barnes, “The 
Political Foundations of Post-communist Regimes”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, 
no. 5, 2002, pp. 524-553; Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: 
Theories and Facts”, World Politics, vol. 49, no. 2, 1997, pp. 155-183; James Robinson, 
“Economic Development and Democracy”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 9, 
2006, pp. 503-527. 
5
 Raymond Duch, “Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free 
Market in the Republics of the Former Soviet Union”, American Political Science Review, 
vol. 87, no. 3, 1993, pp. 590-608; Geoffrey Evans, Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and 
Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies”, 
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 4, 1995, pp. 485-514; Ada Finifter, 
“Attitudes toward Individual Responsibility and Political Reform in the Former Soviet 
Union”, American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 1, 1996, pp. 138-152; Jerry 
Hough, “The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes toward Economic Reform and 
Democratization”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 10, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-37. 
6
 Geoffrey Evans, Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment:..cit”; William Mishler, Richard Rose, “Trajectories of Fear and Hope: 
Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 28, 
no. 4, 1996, pp. 553-581; Richard Rose, William Mishler, “Mass Reaction to Regime 
Change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards”, British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 24, no. 2, 1994, pp. 159-182; Richard Rose, William Mishler, 
Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist 
Societies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998. 
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between countries7. In all these studies, however, support for democracy and 
acceptance of authoritarian alternatives are considered to be the opposite ends 
of the dimension measuring support for democracy.  
One cannot study support for democracy without going back to the roots, 
to Easton’s work on system support. Easton defined diffuse support as 
“evaluations of what an object is or represents … not of what it does”8, while 
specific support was defined as “a consequence from some specific satisfactions 
obtained from the system with respect to a demand that the members make, can 
be expected to make, or that is made on their behalf”9. Later, Muller expanded 
the definition of specific support and argued that “the most useful conception of 
specific support is not that its distinctive characteristic is demand satisfaction, 
but simply that it involves members’ evaluations of the performance of political 
authorities”10. 
Our understanding of the stability of political systems changed as a result 
of distinguishing between the two types of support: a political system can 
maintain its stability for long periods of time, even when faced with low levels 
of specific support, as long as these are counterbalanced by satisfactory levels 
of diffuse support. The distinction between diffuse and specific support can also 
be interpreted, following Linz, in terms of legitimacy (as diffuse support) and of 
efficacy and efficiency (as specific support). Linz argued, just like Easton, that 
the efficacy and effectiveness of a political system can strengthen, reinforce, 
maintain or weaken the belief in its legitimacy11. More recently, several authors 
have refined Easton’s schema even more, distinguishing among different types 
of specific support12.  
                                                 
7
 Russell Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political 
Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004; 
Ronald Inglehart, “How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy: And How Do We Measure 
It?”, Political Science and Politics, vol. 36, no. 1, 2003, pp. 51-57; Ronald Inglehart, 
Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis”, in Pippa 
Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 32-56; William Mishler, Richard Rose, “Learning and 
Re-Learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes”, European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 41, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-36. 
8
 David Easton, “A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support", British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 5, no. 4, 1975, p. 444. 
9
 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, New York, 1965, p. 268. 
10
 Edward Muller, “The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences 
for Regime Support”, American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4, 1970, p. 1152. 
11
 Juan Linz, “Crisis, Breakdown, and Requilibration”, in Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan (eds.), 
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, p. 18. 
12
 For more details, see Russell Dalton, “Political Support in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies”, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens…cit., pp. 57-77; Hans-Dieter 
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The approach I am using in this paper follows Easton’s concepts of 
diffuse and specific support. Instead of using a single measure of diffuse or 
specific support, I operationalize support for democracy starting from five 
variables that capture people’s opinions on this issue: agreement with the 
statement that democracy is better than any other form of government and 
evaluations of different forms of governing the respondent’s country (having a 
democratic political system, having a strong leader who does not have to bother 
with Parliament and the elections, having experts make decisions according to 
what they think is best for the country, and having the army rule the country).  
The last four items I use are known in the literature as the “democracy-
autocracy preference” scale and have been used as components of a 
unidimensional scale in numerous studies13. Using data for 36 countries from 
the 2000 World Values Survey, Ariely and Davidov address the issue of cross-
national comparisons of the democracy-autocracy preference scale and show 
that in order for it to be comparable among respondents from different 
countries, one item (having a democratic political system) needs to be 
eliminated from the scale. Once this item is excluded, the other three items can 
be used to construct a single scale that has metric invariance14. 
Rather than excluding from analysis the item mentioned above, I chose to 
add to the democracy-autocracy preference scale the fifth item (the one 
measuring agreement with the “Churchill hypothesis”). The respondents’ 
positions on these five items place the individuals on two dimensions: support 
for democracy (defined by the first two items) and rejection of authoritarian 
alternatives (defined by the last three items). Since all the items I use represent 
support for the principles of the political system, the resulting dependent 
                                                                                                                       
Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s…cit.”, in Ibidem, pp. 32-56; Pippa 
Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?”, in Ibidem, pp. 1-27. 
13
 See, among others, Jeffrey Dixon, “A Clash of Civilizations? Examining Liberal-
Democratic Values in Turkey and the European Union”, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 59, 
no. 4, 2008, pp. 681-708; Yilmaz Esmer, “Is There an Islamic Civilization?”, 
Comparative Sociology, vol. 1, no. 3-4, 2002, pp. 265-298; Christian Haerpfer, “Support 
for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States”, 
International Political Science Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 2008, pp. 411-431; Steven 
Hofmann, “Islam and Democracy: Micro-level Indications of Compatibility”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 6, 2004, pp. 652-676; Zhengxu Wang, Russell 
Dalton, Doh Chull Shin, “Political Trust, Political Performance, and Support for 
Democracy”, in Russell Dalton, Doh Chull Shin (eds.), Citizens, Democracy, and Markets 
around the Pacific Rim, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 135-156; Christian 
Welzel, “Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and 
Sustainment Effects on Democracy”, International Political Science Review, vol. 28, no. 4, 
2007, pp. 397-424. 
14
 Gal Ariely, Eldad Davidov, “Can We Rate Public Support for Democracy in a 
Comparable Way? Cross-National Equivalence of Democratic Attitudes in the World 
Value Survey”, Social Indicators Research, vol. 104, no. 2, 2011, pp. 271-286. 
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variables are indicators of diffuse support for democracy (the dependent 
variables are discussed in detail in the section on data and methodology). The 
main advantage of this approach lies in the clear distinction it makes between 
diffuse and specific support on one hand, and between different sub-dimensions 
of support for democracy on the other, thus addressing some of the problems 
identified in the previous literature. This approach allows distinguishing 
between true democrats and “democrats with adjectives”, those who agree with 
the idea of democracy while, at the same time, disagree with main principles of 
democracy in particular15.  
 
 
Support-Generating Mechanisms 
 
What are the factors that influence support for democracy? Support for 
different ways of governing a country indicates the preference for a certain 
structure of the political system. An individual’s preference for one model or 
the other can be determined through two main mechanisms, one based on 
resources and the other based on ideology. From these two mechanisms I derive 
two general hypotheses (the resource hypothesis and the ideology hypothesis) to 
be tested in this paper. From these general hypotheses one can also derive a 
series of additional hypotheses about the effects of the independent variables 
used in the analysis.  
The first mechanism that can determine an individual’s preference for the 
structure of the political system is resource-based. According to this 
mechanism, the resources a person has at his or her disposal will determine, 
partly, the preference for a specific form of governing the country. Starting from 
the assumptions that those who are better off have fewer reasons to change the 
political system, the following general hypothesis can be stated:  
 
The resource hypothesis: The higher the level of resources available to an 
individual, the higher that person’s level of support for democracy and the lower their 
level of support for authoritarian alternatives. 
 
The first set of independent variables I use in analyses is represented by 
indicators of socio-economic status: gender, age, education, income, and 
employment. Gender is a control variable; there are no reasons to believe that 
attitudes towards democracy vary by gender. Age can be interpreted as an 
indicator of availability of resources: as people age they accumulate more and 
                                                 
15
 Andreas Schedler, Rodolfo Sarsfield, “Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Direct and 
Indirect Measures of Democratic Support”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 49, 
no. 5, 2007, pp. 637-659. 
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more resources. A second interpretation argues that, as a general rule, older 
people tend to be more conservative than younger people. Moreover, in post-
communist countries, in addition to the position in the life cycle, age also 
captures the respondent’s experiences with different types of political and 
economic systems. Based on these different interpretations, I expect the effect 
of age on support for democracy and on rejection of authoritarian alternatives to 
be positive in the group of Western democracies, and negative in the group of 
ex-communist countries.  
Education and income are the main indicators of resources I use in 
analyses. Educationoffers individuals a better set of tools that can help them to 
cope with changes in the economic and political arenas. I expect education to 
have a positive effect on both sub-dimensions of support for democracy. 
Incomeshould also have a significant effect on support for the structure of the 
political and economic system. Higher income should be associated with higher 
levels of support for democracy and higher levels of rejection of authoritarian 
alternatives. Employment status is included in the model as a control variable.  
The analysis should also include a series of variables measuring 
evaluations of the way democracy and the market economy are functioning, and 
optimism about economic prospects both for the individual and for the 
community. These forms of specific support are considered to be among the 
most important determinants of support16. Unfortunately, the European Values 
Study does not include many of the items used in the literature to capture the 
effects of these evaluations17.  
                                                 
16
 Ian McAllister, “The Economic Performance of Governments”, in Pippa Norris (ed.), 
Critical Citizens…cit., pp. 188-203; Arthur Miller, Ola Listhaug, “Political Performance 
and Institutional Trust”, in Ibidem, pp. 204-216; William Mishler, Richard Rose, “Trust, 
Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-
communist Societies”, Journal of Politics, vol. 59, no. 2, 1997, pp. 418-451; Idem, “What 
Are the Origins of Political Trust: Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-
communist Societies”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, 2001, pp. 30-62; 
Robert Rohrschneider, Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in 
Unified Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. 
17
 For a discussion of the sociotropic theory and of the personal experiences versus the 
national assessment hypothesis, see Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American 
National Elections, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981; Roderick Kiewiet, 
Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983; Michael Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The 
Major Western Democracies, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1988; Michael 
Mackuen, Robert Erikson, James Stimson, “Peasants or Bankers? The American 
Electorate and the U.S. Economy”, American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 3, 
1992, pp. 597-611; Gregory Markus, “The Impact of Personal and National Economic 
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis”, American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 1, 1988, pp. 137-154. 
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There are only three evaluation variables available. The first one, 
satisfaction with life, measures a generalized form of evaluation, based on the 
resources that individuals have at their disposal, without offering a referent for 
the evaluation. I believe this variable will capture in an indirect way 
respondents’ subconscious evaluations of the current situation in the country. 
The higher the level of satisfaction with life, the higher the level of support for 
democracy and the higher the rejection of authoritarian alternatives should be. 
The second one, satisfaction with democracy, is a measure of specific support 
for democracy. This variable should have positive effects on support for 
democracy and on rejection of authoritarian alternatives. The third one, 
evaluations of government performance, is a clearly defined measure of specific 
support for one of the most important actors of the political and economic 
systems. To the extent that diffuse support is influenced by such measures of 
specific support, I expect it to have a positive effect on the dependent variables. 
The remaining variables in the analysis influence support for the structure 
of the political and economic systems through the ideology-based mechanism. 
This mechanism is rooted in the assumption that people acquire and develop, 
during their lifetime, different values and beliefs that have to be integrated into 
a unitary and consistent set. If this assumption is true, then the following 
general hypothesis should also be true: 
 
The ideology hypothesis: An individual’s preference for democracy, for 
authoritarian alternatives, for the free market model, or for the state interventionism 
model should be consistent with other values the individual holds. 
 
Interest in politics has been interpreted as “an indicator of citizens’ 
cognitive involvement in the political process”18. It also seems to be related to 
attitude formation and to political participation19. Both this variable and the 
informed about politics variable, measuring consumption of news on political 
issues, are, in fact, indicators of an informed and active citizen, one that fits the 
image of a democratic citizen. I expect these two variables to have significant 
positive effects on support for democracy and on rejection of authoritarian 
alternatives. Two additional variables, civic activism and political activism, also 
indicate active citizens, who decide to follow their interests using the 
                                                 
18
 Fritz Plasser, Peter Ulram, Harald Waldrauch, Democratic Consolidation in East Central 
Europe, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998. 
19
 Jose Maria Marraval, Regimes, Politics, and Markets: Democratization and Economic 
Change in Southern and Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997; Oskar 
Niedermayer, The European Citizens’ Interest in Politics and their Attitudes and Behavior 
Concerning the EC and European Integration, Reports of the Centre for European 
Surveys and Studies, 90–6, Centre for European Surveys and Studies, Mannheim, 1990; 
Jan Van Deth, “Interest in Politics”, in Kent Jennings, Jan Van Deth (eds.), Continuities in 
Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western 
Democracies, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1990, pp. 275-312. 
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mechanisms set-up by democratic systems for exactly this purpose. The 
effects of these variables should be similar to the ones discussed above. 
The last variable included in the models is the ideological self-
placement on the left-right dimension. In advanced democracies the rules 
of the political system are accepted to the same extent by people, 
regardless of their ideological preferences. Left and right, however, have a 
different meaning in the post-communist countries, leading me to expect 
significant differences between the coefficients of this variable in the 
Western democracies and their coefficients in the ex-communist countries.  
Given the different paths countries have taken on the road to democracy 
and market economy, I analyze the relationship between the two sub-
dimensions of support for democracy at the aggregate level in three groups of 
countries: Western European democracies, Western ex-communist societies, 
and Eastern ex-communist societies20.  
The relationship between support for democracy and rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives should have different forms in the three groups of 
countries. More specifically, based on the path that has led a country to having a 
democratic political system, I have the following expectations: (1) since 
Western European democracies have had a long, organic experience with 
democracy, I expect the correlation between the two sub-dimensions of support 
for democracy to be positive and significant and (2) since ex-communist 
countries have had a shorter experience with democracy and since their 
experiences with democracy have also been affected by extraneous 
factors (economic crises, ethnic conflicts, formation of new states etc.). I 
expect the correlation between the two sub-dimensions of support for 
democracy to be significantly different (either a non-significant correlation 
or a significant but negative correlation) from the one recorded in the group 
of Western democracies. Moreover, given their different interbellum 
experiences and their cultural differences, it is possible that the 
relationship between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian 
alternatives will differ between Western and Eastern ex-communist societies.  
 
 
Data, Variables, and Methodology 
 
The individual-level data used in this paper come from the fourth wave of 
the European Values Study (EVS), conducted between 2008 and 2009. The 
dataset contains data for 44 European countries. I have split the Great Britain 
sample into Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Germany sample into 
                                                 
20
 This classification is based on Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005.  
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West Germany and East Germany, ending up, thus, with 46 cases at level-2. At 
the individual level (level-1), the dataset includes a total of 65.393 cases.  
The two dependent variables related to support for democracy are based 
on five variables representing respondents’ attitudes toward democracy and 
toward authoritarian alternatives: democracy is better than any other form of 
government (measured on a scale from 1, representing strong agreement with 
the statement, to 4, representing strong disagreement with the statement), 
having a democratic political system, having a strong leader, having experts 
make decisions, and having the army rule (all these variables range between 1, 
indicating that having such a system is very good way of governing the country, 
and 4, indicating that having such a system is a very bad way of governing the 
country). The first two of these variables represent support for democracy. I 
have recoded them so that the minimum value (1) represents low support for 
democracy, and the maximum value (4) represents high support for democracy. 
The last three variables represent rejection of authoritarian alternatives, a sub-
dimension which I consider to be distinct from the sub-dimension measuring 
support for democracy. Based on the correlations among the five items and on 
the results of exploratory factor analyses (the specifics of these analyses are 
discussed at the beginning of the next section), I have used the first two 
variables to construct an additive index of support for democracy (rescaled to 
range between 1 and 4). The other three variables were used to construct an 
additive index of rejection of authoritarian alternatives (also rescaled to range 
between 1 and 4).  
The gender variable is coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for female 
respondents. The age variable is used as a set of three dummy variables: under 
30 (the reference category), 30-59, and over 60 years old. Education is used in 
the models as a set of dummy variables indicating lower education (the 
reference category), middle education and upper education. The income 
variable is measured by twelve categories of income. Employment status is used 
in the models as a set of dummy variables indicating the respondent is 
employed, unemployed, retired, or other, including students, and housewives 
(the reference category). Satisfaction with life is a ten-point scale, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of satisfaction with life. Satisfaction with 
democracy is a four-point scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Government evaluation is a ten-
point scale, with higher scores indicating positive evaluations. Ideological self-
placement on the left-right scale is used in the models as a set of dummy 
variables indicating self-placement to the left (scores 1-3 on the original 
variable), to the right (scores 8-10 on the original variable), or to the center (the 
reference category, scores 4-7 on the original variable). Interest in politics is 
measured on a four-point scale, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of 
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interest in politics. Informed about politics is a dummy variable coded 1 for 
respondents who follow news about politics at least several times a week, and 0 
for respondents who follow news about politics less often than weekly. 
Civically active is a dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who belong to at 
least one voluntary organization and 0 for respondents who do not belong to any 
voluntary organizations. Politically active is a dummy variable coded 1 for 
respondents who have been involved in at least one form of protest and 0 for 
respondents who have never been involved in any form of protest activities. 
Country type is a set of dummy variables measured at country level, indicating 
Western European democracies (the reference category), Western ex-
communist societies, or Eastern ex-communist societies.  
The first analyses I present are simple univariate and bivariate descriptive 
analyses, performed in SPSS. When analyzing individual-level data, instead of 
the regular OLS model I estimate the models using HLM, in order to account 
for the clustering of individuals within countries21. Since the country samples 
have different sizes, in all individual-level analyses I use a weight variable 
bringing all samples to the same size (N = 1500), while taking into account the 
weight variable provided by EVS, which controls for the population structure 
by gender and age22. Missing data are deleted listwise. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As shown in the previous section, the dependent variables I use are 
created starting from multiple indicators. Theoretically, for all dependent 
variables the original indicators should group on two dimensions: support for 
democracy and rejections of democratic alternatives. The first step in 
constructing the dependent variables consisted of checking the correlations 
among the original variables, followed by an exploratory factor analysis 
(principal components with extraction of factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one and with varimax rotation) in each of the 46 countries included in analysis.  
The values of the KMO statistic ranged between 0.514 and 0.734 and the 
factor analysis procedure extracted the theoretically expected two factors in 43 
countries. The exceptions were Iceland, where factor analysis extracted only a 
                                                 
21
 For details about hierarchical linear models and about the HLM software, see Stephen 
Raudenbush, Anthony Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Method, 
Sage Publications, London, 2002. 
22
 See EVS, GESIS, EVS 2008 Method Report, GESIS – Technical Reports 2010/17, 2010, 
retrieved from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/download.asp?db=E&id=17682. Last 
accessed: October 10, 2013. 
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single factor, Georgia, where factor analysis extracted three factors, and 
Azerbaijan, which had a two-factor solution different from the one expected. 
When asked to extract only two factors, the solutions for Georgia and Iceland 
conformed to the theoretical expectation. The two factors, support for 
democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives explain, together, between 
50% and 68% of the variance.  
Given that in 45 of the 46 countries included in analysis the factor 
analysis solutions conformed to the theoretical expectation regarding the 
grouping of the five variables, I decided to use in analyses the two additive 
indices: support for democracy and rejection of democratic alternatives. Figure 
1 presents the relationship between these two sub-dimensions for each of the 
three groups of countries I analyze: Western European democracies, Western 
ex-communist societies, and Eastern ex-communist societies. 
The three graphs reveal a series of interesting patterns. First, it should be 
noted that the correlation between the two sub-dimensions is positive and strong 
in the older European democracies, as expected: countries with a higher average 
score on the support for democracy variable tend to have higher average scores 
on the rejection of authoritarian alternatives variable as well. Portugal is the 
only country of this group that stands out, due to the rather low average score 
on the rejection of authoritarian alternatives variable. Second, it should be noted 
that the correlation between the two sub-dimensions in the Eastern ex-
communist group is not significant. This result suggests that in these countries 
support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives are two distinct 
and unrelated dimensions. The most important result, however, is the one 
recorded for the group of Western ex-communist societies. The correlation in 
this group is positive and strong, similar to the one observed in the group of 
older democracies.  
  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives by type of country, EVS 2008-2009 
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This result suggests that, from this perspective, the Western ex-
communist societies are more similar to the older democracies (countries with 
which they share a more or less common culture and a common history between 
the two wars) than to the Eastern ex-communist societies (countries with which 
they share only the experience of the communist regimes). The results presented 
so far suggest that the Iron Curtain shifted towards east, leaving the Eastern ex-
communist societies still struggling to accept that authoritarian alternatives are 
not acceptable for a democratic system. 
I move now the focus of the discussion from these descriptive analyses to 
multivariate analyses. Given the structure of the data, with people nested within 
countries, all the individual-level analyses presented next are performed using 
HLM, thus accounting for the clustering effects. The first models I estimated 
were the fully unconditional models (i.e. one-way random-effects ANOVA 
models), which partition the variance of the dependent variable into variance 
within countries and variance between countries.  
The intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) show that 12% of the 
variance in support for democracy is between countries (with the remaining 
88% being within countries between people). In the case of rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives, there is significantly more variance between 
countries: 23% of the variance is between countries (with the remaining 77% of 
the variance being within countries between people). For both dependent 
variables related to support for democracy, the ICC coefficients show that there 
is significant variation between countries.  
The full models explaining support for democracy and rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives are presented in Table 1. Additional intermediate 
models are not shown here but are available from the author upon request. 
Given the fact that two independent variables suffer from a large proportion of 
missing data (income has 18% missing data and left-right has 25% missing 
data), I have estimated additional models (without both variables, without 
income, and without left-right) in order to check for the sensitivity of the 
results. In all models the coefficients keep their signs and their significance, 
suggesting that the reduction in the number of cases at level-1 does not modify 
the relationships identified in the final model. 
By comparison to the fully unconditional models, the model for support 
for democracy explains about 10% of the variance recorded at the individual 
level, and about 54% of the variance recorded at the country level (these 
coefficients are, in fact, proportional reduction in error measures and they can 
be interpreted as equivalents of the multiple determination coefficients from 
OLS models.). The model for rejection of authoritarian alternatives explains 
about 7% of the variance recorded at the individual level, and about 72% of the 
variance recoded at the country level. 
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Table 1 
HLM Models for Support for Democracy  
and Rejection of Authoritarian Alternatives 
 
 
Support  
for democracy 
Rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives 
Intercept 2.693 (0.074) *** 2.731 (0.060) *** 
Western ex-communist -0.145 (0.058) * -0.110 (0.080) 
 
Eastern ex-communist -0.090 (0.067) 
 
-0.431 (0.068) *** 
Gender: Male -0.006 (0.009) 
 
0.005 (0.009) 
 
Age: 30 - 59 0.093 (0.016) *** 0.111 (0.033) *** 
x Western ex-communist -0.088 (0.029) ** -0.081 (0.038) * 
x Eastern ex-communist -0.065 (0.030) * -0.101 (0.038) ** 
Age: 60 and over 0.135 (0.024) *** 0.155 (0.039) *** 
x Western ex-communist -0.121 (0.032) *** -0.098 (0.051) 
 
x Eastern ex-communist -0.160 (0.036) *** -0.168 (0.046) *** 
Education: medium education 0.055 (0.008) *** 0.069 (0.012) *** 
Education: high education 0.150 (0.014) *** 0.152 (0.014) *** 
Income 0.019 (0.005) *** 0.026 (0.005) *** 
x Western ex-communist -0.001 (0.015) 
 
-0.031 (0.011) ** 
x Eastern ex-communist -0.006 (0.014) 
 
-0.010 (0.019) 
 
Employment: employed -0.031 (0.012) * -0.014 (0.013) 
 
Employment: retired -0.016 (0.014) 
 
-0.038 (0.018) * 
Employment: unemployed -0.034 (0.020) 
 
-0.038 (0.017) * 
Satisfaction with life 0.012 (0.003) *** 0.011 (0.004) ** 
Satisfaction with democracy 0.075 (0.009) *** -0.008 (0.012) 
 
Government evaluation 0.019 (0.004) *** 0.002 (0.005) 
 
Left-Right: Left 0.082 (0.014) *** 0.135 (0.017) *** 
x Western ex-communist -0.119 (0.034) *** -0.149 (0.025) *** 
x Eastern ex-communist -0.089 (0.033) ** -0.155 (0.033) *** 
Left-Right: Right -0.004 (0.017) 
 
-0.067 (0.029) * 
x Western ex-communist 0.050 (0.031) 
 
0.068 (0.038) 
 
x Eastern ex-communist 0.073 (0.028) ** 0.001 (0.039) 
 
Interest in politics 0.036 (0.009) *** 0.027 (0.009) ** 
Informed about politics 0.072 (0.015) *** 0.060 (0.015) *** 
Civically active 0.017 (0.013) 
 
-0.015 (0.013) 
 
Politically active 0.093 (0.015) *** 0.048 (0.015) ** 
Level-2 variance, u0 0.020 
  
0.029 
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Level-1 variance, r 0.286 
  
0.320 
  
PRE at level-2 0.544 
  
0.722 
  
PRE at level-1 0.099 
  
0.066 
  
Level-1 N 36430 
  
34962 
  
Notes: (1) Significance levels: * p < 0.050, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001. (2) Level-2 N = 46. (3) 
Reference category for type of country: Western democracy. (4) Reference groups: female (for 
gender), age under 30 (for age), lower education (for education), housewife, student, other (for 
employment), and Center (for Left-Right). 
 
The intercept coefficients show the average level of support for 
democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives for the three groups of 
countries included in analysis. They show that the average level of support for 
democracy is slightly lower in Western ex-communist societies. The main 
result, however, is found in the case of rejection of authoritarian alternatives: in 
this model the Eastern ex-communist societies have a significantly lower 
average score. Comparing the coefficients for the two models, it can be argued 
that the rejection of authoritarian alternatives is the variable that distinguishes 
best among the three groups of countries.  
Moving on to the slope coefficients, in addition to the results presented in 
Table 1, the coefficients for those variables that include an interaction term with 
the type of country are presented, in a graphical format in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Slope coefficients for select variables ‒ support for democracy model 
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The slope coefficients for age show that in Western democracies support 
for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives increase with age. The 
coefficients for the interaction terms between age and type of country show that 
in ex-communist countries the effect of age is significantly lower than in 
Western democracies. Computing the slope coefficients for the former 
communist countries shows that in this group the effect of age on the two 
dependent variables is not significantly different from zero.  
Education has a significant positive effect on both dependent variables: 
low levels of education are associated with lower levels of support for 
democracy on both sub-dimensions, while the highest levels of support are 
recorded for those with higher education. The effect of education is similar in 
all three groups of countries (in the model including interaction terms for this 
variable, their coefficients are not significant).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Slope coefficients for select variables ‒ rejection of authoritarian alternatives model 
 
Income has a significant positive effect on both dependent variables, 
indicating that respondents with higher income tend to have higher levels of 
support for democracy on both sub-dimensions. This positive effect is similar in 
all groups of countries, the exception being the effect on rejection of 
authoritarian alternatives in the group of Western ex-communist countries, 
where the slope coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  
The only substantively significant result for the employment variable is 
recorded in the model for rejecting authoritarian alternatives: unemployed and 
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retired respondents have a lower score on this variable by comparison to the 
other groups.  
The three evaluation variables included in the models (satisfaction with 
life, satisfaction with democracy, and government evaluations) have significant 
positive effects on the support for democracy sub-dimensions, suggesting the 
existence of an effect of specific support for democracy on diffuse support for 
democracy. In the model for rejection of authoritarian alternatives, however, the 
only variable with a significant effect is satisfaction with life, which increases 
the level of support.  
The four variables representing informed and active citizens (interest in 
politics, informed about politics, civically active, and politically active) show 
that “democratic citizens” tend to have higher levels of support for democracy 
and a higher rate of rejecting authoritarian alternatives. Involvement in 
voluntary organizations is the only variable in this group that does not achieve 
significance. These results confirm the existence of the link, identified in the 
literature, between democracy and an active population.  
The variable indicating respondents’ position on the left-right continuum 
has interesting coefficients. First, it should be noted that in Western 
democracies respondents who place themselves at the left end of the scale tend 
to have higher levels of support for democracy on both sub-dimensions. In the 
case of ex-communist societies, this relationship disappears: supporters of the 
left are, generally, not significantly different from those who place themselves 
on the center of the left-right dimension with respect to support for democracy.  
In the Western democracies, those who place themselves at the right end 
of the continuum do not differ from the centrists with respect to support for 
democracy, but they seem to have a higher level of acceptance of authoritarian 
alternatives. In ex-communist societies, however, the relationship is different: 
supporters of the right have higher levels of support for democracy in these 
countries. At the same time, supporters of the right in Eastern ex-communist 
countries are similar to their counterparts in Western democracies, in that they 
have higher levels of acceptance of authoritarian alternatives, while supporters 
of the right in Western ex-communist countries do not differ from centrists with 
respect to this variable.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As I stated at the beginning of this paper, this study is based on the idea 
that democracy is a concept too complex to be captured by treating support for 
democracy as a unidimensional phenomenon. Starting from this, I have 
distinguished between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian 
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alternatives and then I tested whether this theoretical distinction fits the reality 
captured by the data. The analyses presented here aimed to identify support-
generating mechanisms, focusing on resources and ideology, and to describe the 
way these mechanisms work in three groups of European countries.  
The analysis of the relationship between the two sub-dimensions of 
support for democracy country level (see Figure 1) revealed that the relationship 
is varying, depending on the type of country. Thus, in Western democracies and 
Western ex-communist societies the sub-dimensions are strongly correlated 
with each other, suggesting that a unidimensional solution fits the data better. 
At the other extreme, the sub-dimensions are independent of each other in the 
case of Eastern ex-communist countries, suggesting that a bi-dimensional 
solution is better suited for the reality of these countries. This represents one of 
the main contributions of this study to the literature.  
In addition to the results presented here, I analyzed, in an additional paper 
the relationship between support for the social democratic model of market 
economy and support for the liberal model of market economy1. According to 
the results presented in that paper, Western ex-communist societies are more 
similar to Eastern ex-communist societies with respect to the configuration of 
attitudes towards different models of market economy. Taking both sets of 
results into account, citizens of the three groups of countries I analyzed have 
different understandings of the principles of the political and economic systems 
that govern their lives. 
The results of the multilevel regression models offer some support for the 
general hypotheses presented at the beginning of the paper. The coefficients for 
gender, age, education and income are consistent with the resource hypothesis: 
they show that respondents with more available resources tend to have higher 
levels of support for democracy and higher levels of rejection of authoritarian 
alternatives. Some of these coefficients vary significantly across the three 
groups of countries, but these variations fit the resource hypothesis as well.  
The behavioral and attitudinal items included in the analyses show that 
the preferences for democracy or authoritarian alternatives have an ideological 
component (as indicated by the significant effects of respondents’ positions on 
the left–right dimension), and are influenced by respondents’ evaluations of the 
current situation. These results are consistent with the ideology hypothesis.  
The main contribution of this study, however, comes from the analysis of 
different sub-dimensions of support for democracy while taking into account the 
effect of living in a former communist country. The results presented in Table 1, 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the variables included in the analysis have 
                                                 
1
 Claudiu Tufiş, “Dividing the Pie: Support for the Free Market and State Interventionism 
Models of Market Economy”, in Loek Halman, Mălina Voicu (eds.), Mapping Value 
Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe, Brill, Leiden, 2010, pp. 71-105. 
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different effects on the dependent variables, depending on the type of country. 
Support for democracy is generated through different mechanisms, depending 
on the type of country. When this difference is not taken into account, the 
implicit assumption is that there are no differences between the types of 
countries and the results are averaged, leading to coefficients that are incorrect.  
Summarizing the findings, it can be argued that both general hypotheses 
describing the support-generating mechanisms (the resource hypothesis and the 
ideology hypothesis) are supported by the data. Finally, the results show that 
support for democracy in former communist countries is generated through 
different mechanisms. Future research should focus on this finding and try to 
explain whether this difference is determined by cultural differences or just by 
development differences between the former communist countries and the rest 
of the European countries. 
